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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Ell\\r 1\RD L. GILL~IOR, ED-
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N ... ~TURE OF CASE 
Action by respondents to enjoin appellant's use 
of' a road and counterclaim by appellant for damages 
for respondents forcibly stopping appellant's use of 
the road. 
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DISPOSITION OF, CASE IN DISTRICT 
COURT 
The District Court entered Summary Judgment 
forever enjoining appellant from using the road for 
hauling salt or other minerals, but left for future trial 
whether appellant had acquired a prescriptive right 
personally to an easement over the road as a means of 
access to the lake shore for exploring and studying the 
mineralogical content of the lake and lakebed lands. 
NATURE OF RELIE}, SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of Summary Judgment of 
August 13, 1963 enjoining appellant from using the 
road for hauling salt and other minerals and vacation of 
District Court order of March 11, 1963, ordering appel-
lant to cease use of the said road or in the alternative 
post a corporate surety bond in the penal sum of $100,-
000.00 or the equivalent in cash. 
STATE~IEN'l, OF FACTS 
Respondents filed a complaint on June 7, 1962, 
to enjoin appellant from use of a road (I) 1• The road 
takes off from the old Saltair Speedway, traverses 
across land (some owned by respondents, some owned 
by persons not parties to this suit) in a northwesterly 
direction to the shores of Great Salt Lake and Ante· 
lope Island. ( 1, 40) . 
1. References are to Transcript. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is the only road to 1-\.ntelope Island and certain 
state o\vncu salt lands \vhich lie off the southerly point 
of .t\ntelope Island. (57 -58; 95-96). 
~.\.ppellant conducted a salt business from salt 
produced fro1n these ~tate salt lands which appellant 
lrased fro1n the state and hauled the salt from said 
leased land on the road until forcibly prevented by re-
spotulents' artned guard (15) damaging his business 
to the extent of $~0,000.00. Appellant alleged that, 
''Continuously and for a period of more than 
30 years prior hereto the defendant and his prede-
cessors in interest have used freely and openly 
"·ithout restraint" ( 14), 
the road~ and further that during more than 30 years 
the general public has used the road, Salt Lake County 
has n1anitained the road, and the road has been dedi-
cated to the public use. 
On X ov. 13th, 1962, after hearing, the District 
Court restrained appellant from use of the road unless 
he filed a bond in the penal sum of $2500.00, which bond 
'vas filed. ( 35) . 
On Feb. -tth~ 1963, respondents filed Motion for 
Sunm1ary Judgment referring to certain portions of 
appellant's deposition and submitting supporting affi-
davits of ''Tilliam Olwell, manager of respondent 
Island Ranching Co., and respondents Edward L. 
Gillmor ~ C. Francis Gillmor, Jr. ( 36-44) . 
On Feb. 8th, 1963, appellant's attorney withdre'v 
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from the case. ( 45) . On Feb. 19th, 1963, respondents 
served notice of hearing a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment for Feb. 15th, 1963. ( 47). Hearing was continued 
to March 8th, 1963. ( 48). On March 5th appellant's 
present attorney filed affidavit that appellant desired 
him to take over the defense and after examination of 
files was of the opinion that he "will not" have time (by 
3 days) to adequately prepare to oppose the Motion 
by March . 8 and "\\rould need 30 days to prepare an 
. . ('fq) l . ff'.d . l . . 
opposition. Upon t liS a I av1t, 1earing was continued 
until April 8th. (51). Thereupon affidavit by respond-
ent Frank Gillmor, Jr., was filed stating that operation 
of appellant's trucks through the land would destroy its 
utility as lambing grounds, which lambing season is from 
early March until May or June, depending on the sea-
son. (52-53) . vVhereupon the court vacated its order 
continuing the hearing to April 8th, 1963, and ordered 
appellant to show cause on March 8th why the court 
should not act upon the Summary Judgment on March 
8th. (56). On March 8th appellant's attorney filed 
affidavit that he had ascertained from the State Land 
Office that the road in controversy had been used by 
the state whenever necessary to visit state salt lands 
without respondents' consent and other lessees of said 
state lands had likewise used the road 'vhich is the only 
road to said lands for more than 20 years; that the 
state also owned land on Antelope Island that has been 
served by this road; and that it appeared that appellant 
might haYe a defense based on an easement appurtenant 
to the state lands leased by appellant fro1n the state; 
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thut there should he discovery and opportunity to cross 
t'XUiltitte respondents, as Inany facts 'vere within re-
spotl(lcnts' peculiar knowledge. (57-58). 
The court on ~larch 8th granted a continuance of 
lhe hearing until .L\pril 8th, 1963, but exacted a heavy 
pt'nalty. In addition to the $2500.00 bond that had been 
posted by appellant, the court ordered that appellant 
cease use of the road or post ''a corporate surety bond 
in the penal stun of $100,000.00 or the equivalent in 
cush.,, ( ~39-60) . 
'rhe hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, 
after rescheduling, was set for August 6, 1963. Re-
spondents also moved for reimbursement and damages 
on the $i~300.00 bond at that time. 
In the meantitne, respondents had answered inter-
rogatories, the objections to which had been overruled 
and appellant had filed additional affidavits of Albert 
L. Thomas, ( 93-9~) , and appellant's counsel ( 95-105) , 
in opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On August 1, 1963, appellant moved to vacate the 
order of )larch 11, 1963, that appellant remain off the 
road or post a bond or cash in the sum of $100,000.00, 
and scheduled i?/W ~earin~ with the Motion for ~um­
Iuury Judgment. This motion 'vas supported by his af-
fidavit that he did not have the necessary assets to post 
such a bond, that by reason of this order he had been 
unable to operate his salt business, which was irreparably 
damaged; that he has never damaged said road. ( 88-
89). 
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Evidence l~roffered By Respondents To Sustain 
Sum1nary Judgment - The portions of the appellant's 
deposition relied upon by respondents is that at certain 
times appellant had noticed gates on the road and that 
there has been guards posted for the benefit of duck 
clubs. That his only [previous] hauling of salt on the 
road was fro1n purchases of salt from Thomas Brothers. 
The affidavits of respondents, in addition to their 
protestations that the road is a private road, aver that 
there has been gates maintained on the road; that users 
had closed the gates when necessary for the conduct 
of sheep and cattle business. That for several weeks each 
year the public is barred from the road by an armed 
watchman employed by the duck clubs with the per-
mission of respondent Edward L. Gillmor; that no 
one had been granted permission to use the road except 
the Island Ranching Company and various duck clubs 
by virtue of written agreements with "certain Gill-
mars'' ; that there has been no use of the road without 
the consent of respondents or predecessors in interest. 
"Evidencen Proffered by Appellant in Opposition 
to Motion For Sumrnary Judgment - The assertions 
by respondents that the road had not been used except 
by the consent of them or their predecessors in interest, 
is denied. Not only is it denied by appellant's answer 
and counterclai1n wherein he alleges that the road was 
so used for 1nore than 30 years by appellant and his 
predecessors, but by appellant's affidavits. The affi-
daYits specifically contradict respondents' affidavits 
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that represent that the only salt hauled on the road is 
"lin1ited qunntities", ''developed and transported under 
lease ,vith the Gillmors". Affidavit of Albert L. Thomas 
( U3-U-t) sho,vs 'rhomas used the road under claim of 
right. t'rotn 1939 to 1953, to haul salt produced from 
stnte salt lands leased front the state. During part of 
this perio<l (1950-1953) he had a lease with son1e Gill-
tnors for land adjoining the salt lands. The lease from 
the Gillmors did not provide permission to use the road. 
"\nd the lessors were aware that permissive use pre-
,·ents easements. For in paragraph 12 of the Thomas 
lease they granted a right-of-way across the uzeasedn 
lund. (See copy of Gillmor-Thomas Lease (95-105) ). 
Another lessee of the state salt lands was D. S. 
\\"ycoff. 'I'he Wycoff lease wa~ from April 15, 1955 
to ~larch 1, 1963. (95-96). 
Hence from 1939 to 1963 the state salt lands off 
Antelope Island were leased for salt development. The 
lessees and the state used the road during this period. 
It \vas last used for hauling salt from state land by 
appellant until March, 1962, when he was forcibly 
stopped by respondents. 
One apparent reason respondents and their prede-
cessors in interest never claimed proprietorship over 
the road is that they did not and do not own all the land 
the road trat'erses. ( 40). See also record in Salt 
La~:e County v. Edward L. Gillmor~ et al. No. 137050, 
District Court, Salt Lake County, which cause the Dis-
trict l"'ourt judicially noticed ii1 the instant case) . 
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' . . (?!) In answers to appellants Interrogatories respond-
ents answered that Wycoff was granted permission to 
use the road by written lease agreement of Oct. 27, 
1955, between the Gillmors and Wycoff. This also is not 
the fact. The Wycoff lease did not grant permission 
to use the road, it leased 'Vycoff property adjacent to 
the state leased land. It (as did the Thomas lease) only 
granted a right-of-way over the "demised" premises 
to haul salt produced on state salt lands . (See para. 
14, p. 104). 
With respect to the permission of the respondents 
to the duck clubs to post armed watchmen, respon~I\ts 
furnished a partially illegible agreement of 192f7He-
tween a "Gillmor Brothers Company" and certain 
duck clubs, permitting the duck clubs to construct and 
maintain a road through "various parcels of land" 
owned by the "Gillmor Brothers Company" and ap· 
parently maintain a watchman through the shooting 
season. The only definite agreement by the respondents 
referring to part of the road here in controversy was 
a result of compromise in the recent case in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Lake Front Gun and Rec-
lamation Club~ Inc. v. Gillmor~ No. 117279. It also 
appears that the permission given respondent Island 
Improvement Company was a result of the law suit of 
Gillmor v. Island Irnprovement Company~ District 
Court, Salt Lake County, No. 56378 of 1937. (72-73). 
Appellant was not a party to and hence not bound by 
either of these suits. 
10 
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~,urther. the arJned guards were to prevent poach-
in.,· on Jutk clubs located on the right fork of the road 
l"" 
-not persons \vhose interests led them to the left fork 
leading to 1\ntelope Island and the state salt lands. 
\Set' Thorn as Affidavit 94}. 
~ \ ppellant found it difficult to obtain affidavits 
t'ron1 people 'vho for various reasons do not 'vish to 
becorne involved in the controversy. ( 96). 
"'\fter the hearing of August 6th, the court entered 
the judgment of Aug. 13th, herein appealed from. The 
court enjoined appellant from using the road to haul 
salt and declined to entertain appellant's Motion to 
\"al'ate the Order of the District Court of March lith 
ordering appellant to post $100,000.00 bond or cash 
or cease use of the road, and indicated "said Motion 
"·ould be required to be presented to the judge issuing 
the order". But the court's judgment enjoining appel-
lant frorn using the road rendered moot the Motion 
to \"'ncate The Order of March lith. 
ARGU~IENT 
I 
1,HE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EN-
'fEl{lXG St'")l:\Ir\.RY JUDGMENT ENJOIN-
IXG ... -\PPELLAXT FROM USE OF THE 
R04\.D \\'"HEX APPELLANT HAD PLEADED 
~fll~\'f l~OXTINUOUSL Y FOR l\IORE THAN 
30 \TE ... -\RS .~.-\PPELLANT AND HIS PREDE-
CI·:SSORS HAD FREELY AND OPENLY 
lTSED 'fHE ROAD. 
11 
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Summary Judgment should not be rendered if a 
material fact asserted by a plaintiff is contradicted by 
a defendant. Here appellant asserted such a fact. In his 
Answer and Counterclaim he alleged that continuously 
for more than 30 years appellant and his predecessors 
freely and openly had used the road. Appellant respect-
fully submits that this issue should be litigated by trial. 
Many facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of 
respondents. Close and rigorous cross examination is 
necessary. 
It is not the function of Summary Judgment pro-
cedure to determine issues of fact by affidavits; but 
only to determine if issues exist. If issues exist, they 
should be determined by trial. 
Christense·n v. Financial Service Co.~ 14 Ut (2d) 
101, 377 p ( 2) 1010. 
Disabled American Veterans v. Hendricksen, 9 
Utah (2d) 152 340 P (2d) 152. 
Fountain v. Filson~ 336 U.S. 681, 69 S. Ct. 754. 
Lacy v. U.S.~ 207 F (2d) 352. 
Saylor v. Fayette Plumbing_, Inc.~ 30 F.R.D. 176. 
Thomas v. lJlartin~ 8 F.R.D. 638. 
Further, appellant has shown that credibility of 
the parties is crucial. This makes a trial indispensable. 
Arnstein v. Porter~ 154 F (2d) 464. 
12 
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II. 
'r 111~: I> l S'l,lt I l~'r l~< > { ~ lt'f EllRED IX EX-
'ri·~Hl~(; .Jl.l>(~:\IEX'l, ENJOI~IXG APPEL-
I~"\ \"'r I~,l{{))l l~SE 0~., 'THE ROAD \\rHEK 
t\ I, I)~: I~ I ~ ~ \ X' l,' S 1. \.~,I~, I D .r\. \.,.ITS INDICATED 
~\\ ~:.\SE:\li1:XT '1"'0 USE 'l,HE ROAD AP-
Pl.lt'l'I1:X..:\X'f 'fO L1\.ND LEASED BY AP-
PJ4~I.JI~.\~'f Fl{0:.\1 THE S'fATE . 
. \ ppellant reaffirms his position: Issues should not 
he tried hy affidaYits. Contested issues of fact are a 
ana tter for trial. 
.. \ ppellant has not attempted to try its case by 
ntfida ,·its. He desires a trial. 
But nevertheless, it is no doubt apparent to the 
l'ourt that appellant made a strong case of an easement 
appurtenant to the land leased by appellant from the 
state. 'fhis easement \\·as established by the state's 
use of the road to reach its salt lands and by open, 
adverse use of this road by state lessees from 1939 
until 19H:.? ( :.?3 years), ( 93-9~, 95-105). The District 
Court. although recognizing this, "·as troubled because 
it appeared the lessees 1nay hav-e leased different parts 
of the salt lands. But even if this be so, it would not 
be significant "·hen the same road was used to reach 
the s:une do1ninant tenament (state salt lands), and 
the use of the road \\·as to the same extent-hauling salt 
fro1n the dominent tenament. 
Evidence "·ill sho\v the complete picture on this. 
13 
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Salt is taken from the water, not land. The lands en1-
braced by the Wycoff, Thomas and Carter leases were 
utilized to some extent by all the lessees in flowing 
and trapping the water to the spot the lessees had their 
respective salt ponds. The site of the ponds were chosen 
with reference to the lake level. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EN-
TERING JUDGMENT ENJOINING APPEL-
LANT FROJ.\;1 USING THE ROAD IN HAUL-
ING SALT WHEN IT IS INDICATED THAT 
THERE \VAS A WAY BY NECESSITY TO 
USE SAID ROAD APPURTENANT TO THE 
LAND LEASED BY APPELLANT FROM 
THE STATE. 
Where there is a conveyance of land and no means 
of access thereto, except over land of the grantor, a way 
of necessity over such land is ordinarily granted by 
implication of law. This principle may apply in the 
instant case with respect to these salt lands which 
became vested in the State of Utah in 1896 when Utah 
'vas admitted to the Union. Such an application of the 
law of easement by necessity would not be without 
precedent. See Snyder 'l~. Warford~ II l\Io. 513, 49 Am. 
D. 94. The defense was open to appellant by virtue of 
his denial in para. 2 of his answer, and was argued 
in opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IV. 
'fll~~ DIS'fRilHf COL~RT ERRED IN EN-
'fElliXG ORDEit OF ~lARCH II, 1963, THA'l" 
.\PPELLAN'l, CEASE TO USE THE ROAD 
<>Ill)OST "\ llOND IN 'l,HE SU~I OF $100,000.00 
<>It t'.ASH. 
'rhis order to post $100,000.00 bond or cash or stop 
using the road 'vas the penalty appellant had to pay 
for a l'ontinuance. Continuance was necessary because 
appellant's attorney, who had been handling the case, 
withdre,v, nnd the substituted attorney could not pre-
pure to Ineet the Motion by March 8th. '!,here was no 
tnotion to increase the $2500.00 bond. 
The order amounted to an arbitrary order that 
appellant get off the road without the need for respond-
ents posting a bond because appellant simply did not 
hnYe the $100,000.00 in cash or assets. ( 88). Appel-
lant had no other source of revenue other than from 
these salt beds. ( 126). Appellant requests this court 
to vacate the order of March lith and restore appellant 
to use of the road pending trial. 
Just ho'v responsible were respondents' claims of 
d:unage can be judged by the affidavits they submitted 
in support of their ~lotion for Damages under the 
8:!500.00 bond. 'Villiam Olwell of respondent Island 
Rnnching Co. pins the damage on appellant because 
fron1 his window in the \\Talker Bank Building he saw 
''dust created by defendant's movement on the road.'' 
\78). Respondent Ed"~ard Lester Gillmor avers it was 
15 
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necessary to replace one culvert, at cost of $68.69; cost 
of gravel $I5.00; tractor and operator four hours 
$56.00; total $I39.69; that it would be necessary to re-
place two other culverts; and attaches bills to respondent 
Island Ranching Con1pany for $340.00 road material, 
claims $140.00 for said respondents (cost of spreading) 
and estimates of another $500.00. (79-80). ''re ask 
the court: Note the insufficiency of these affidarits. 
Respondents would have the court believe that only 
appellant used this ro~~l. Respondents' use of the road 
is not mentioned. Yet (as appears by appellants' affi-
davit) respondent Island Ranching Company used 
heavy diesel trucks and semi-trailers carrying loads of 
hay, grain, and cattle, of 20 to 25 tons per load, ap-
proximately 3 or 4 times the weight of any of appel-
lant's loads, the culvert replaced had been damaged 
by a road grader at the time appellant commenced 
using the road; and appellant hauled approximately 200 
loads of gravel and 'vith his own equipment spread the 
gravel. {9"-9 i) 
Appellant submits that respondents' showing of 
damage demonstrated that obtaining the bond and in-
junction as well as the order of l\1arch II th was harass-
ment. Appellant submits that the District Court's order 
of March 11, 1963, should be Yacated. 
v. 
1,HE DISrfRIC'f COURT ERRED IN DE-
Cll~~EING THAT THE DISMISSAL ''rJTH 
16 
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Plt~~JUDIC'J1~ IN 'fHE C'-1\SE OF SAL'f LAI\:E 
COlrN'rY \rS. EDWARD L. GILLMOR ET AL., 
DIS'fltiC'f COUR1., SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
DOCKE'f NO. 137050, W1\.S BINDING ON THE 
COl~lt'l' .t\ND APPELLANT SO THAT AP-
PELLAN1" l~OULD NOT MAKE USE OF THE 
RO.i\D UNDER CLAIM OF PUBLIC ROAD. 
'fhc Court took j udi~ial notice of the case of Salt 
Lake County vs. Edward L. Gill~mor~ et al~ Docket No. 
137050, in the District Court, Salt Lake County, where 
Salt Lake Cotmty sued respondents seeking to have 
the road involved decreed a public road. This action 
was not tried but was dismissed with prejudice. Appel-
lant \vas not a party to that cause. 
It 1nay be that when a cause is instituted by a po-
litical subdivision and tried and decree rendered that 
1nembers of the public n1ay be bound on the issue of a 
public way, although of course they would not be fore-
closed from showing an easement over the land. But 
appellant respectfully submits that such situation should 
not prevail when there is no trial. Dismissal, whether 
with prejudice or 'vithout prejudice, should not bind 
non-parties from showing a public way in such situation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not the function of a proceeding for Summary 
~udgment to substitute trial by affidavit for one's day 
•n court and Summary Judgment should not be ren-
dered if there is an issue of any material fact. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
enjoining appellant from using the road to haul salt 
should be reversed and the order of March 11, 1963, 
that appellant cease use of the road or post a $100,000.00 
bond should be vacated. 
Dated December 3, 1963. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William H. Hnederson 
711 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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